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Since World War II the transfer of arms to less developed countries (LUCs) 
has evolved through several successive stages The 195Us and early 1960s were 
characterized by the export of outdated surplus equipment Ihe 1960s and 1970s 
saw an increasing sophistication in exported equipment and the re-entry into 
the supplier category of some traditional arms producers By the 1970s a 
phenomenon in the transfer of military and security equipment to LOCs, though 
not new, became increasingly noticeable the transfer of arms technology
This paper will discuss tms phenomenon as it pertains to France It is 
argued that France may be seen as a representative middle range power in the 
evolution of the arms transfer system ot the post war era The French 
government after deciding that exports were necessary to build and then 
maintain the greatest possible range ot domestically produced armaments soon 
found itself in an export dependence Ihe result was a shift in arms sales 
decision criteria away trom military- strategic considerations, ind more coward 
economic determinants In a competitive international arms market the addition 
ot technology transfers, where conventional sales are more difficult to make is 
only a logical extension of economic dependence on military sales
Arms technology transfers, in general rre Seen as a subcomponent ot the 
international arms market They are not always easily Identifiable and just as 
difficult to define In a most restricted sense one may count only torraal 
licenses for the production of entire systems other less apparent transfers 
include the licensing of subcomponents tor military equipment, from guns to 
sheetraetal or co-production/development agreements The next level would
2include assembly agreements for imported systems fhe sale of maintenance 
equipment, facilitnes services or training can in a broad sense also be seen 
as a technology transfer, as can the design of systems for export to LDCs only 
Similarly, the sale ot turn-key industrial facilities, or tne construction of 
industrial plants by multinationals (automotive, electronics, chemicals) can 
contribute to military technological capabilities, as can the sale of machine 
tools or other heavy goods In the broadest possible sense, even the training 
of students in metallurgy, physics, and civil and nuclear engineering can 
contribute to arms technology transfers
The definition adopted for this paper is by necessity a limited one The 
focus is on licensing agreements as the most visible aspect of technology 
transfers Even here the data is sketchy and often contradictory, but it is 
available from a variety of Independent sources and permits some conclusions to 
be drawn 1
ARMS TRANSFERS SUME GENERAL 1RENDS
France today is the world's third largest arms exporter, and certainly one 
of tne leading countries exporting arms technology to LDCs Before these 
technology transfers can be discussed m  more detail it is necessary to brietly 
summuLize the post WW II emergence ot international arms transfers to LDCs ind 
the French role m  the system The most obvious trends in this system have been 
a shift from surplus and outdated equipment to more modern systems, the 
continued increase in sales, and a shift in supplier patterns
ihe first trend is easily explained by the sale and transfer of WW II 
surplus equipment in the post war decade and a halt to the numerous newly
Jemerging nations As the basic requirements ot these states were met, a gradual 
shift to more modern transfers emerged It was led by the events m  crisis 
areas such as the Middle East, Taiwan, and then Indochina, and driven by the 
need of some LDCs to replace war losses, the confrontational atmosphere of the 
cold war and geostrategic commitments of the major powers These lactors 
simultaneously helped overcome supplier reservations concerning the delivery ot 
more sophisticated arms and create a recipient demand for more such weapons
This trend was not limited to any specific supplier, but France was 
certainly m  the forefront ot this pattern with its deliveries to Israel 
Israel was to demonstrate the capabilities of the new French arms manufacturing 
industry and would thereby provide the best possible advertising
The second discernible trend is the continued quantitative increase in 
sales In 1950 a total ot 6294 million in arras and technology transfers to 
developing countries were recorded (in 1973 constant dollars) The first year 
bales exceeded one billion ($1 461) was 1956 and 1978 was the first in which 
they exceeded ten billion (i?ll 147, in 1975 constant dollars)
A more interesting trend, is the shift in supplier market shares (see TAULE 
l; Britain moved from a strong second place in the early 1950s to fifth by 
1982 in a consistent relative decline Italy's arms sales have been more 
erratic, but the country now supplies almost five percent of sales to LDCs The 
most significant pattern is found in the increase of relative market shares by 
trance The country went from less than one percent to over eleven between 195u 
and 1982 2
The remarkable trench rise as a supplier to LDCs is due to the quality of 
arms, the willingness to supply them, and a strong marketing effort, but it is 
also a consequence of recipient diversification attempts The results of these
4efforts have been demonstrated m  a three period analysis (1964-73, 1973-77, 
1976-80) of supplier dependence This analysis has shown that the number of 
states which are almost exclusively supplied by one state decreased from 26 to 
19 to 16 respectively Only the Soviet Union increased the number of states 
globally that are nearly totally dependent on Soviet military supplies The 
record for principal supplier relations is mixed, from 61 to 45 to 49, but 
multiple supplier relations went from 29 to 56 to 62 France as an arms 
supplier lost clients m  the first two categories, but gained substantially in 
tne multiple supplier classification (from 19 to 30 to 35 states)
These general trends are obviously to the advantage of non superpower 
suppliers As long as specific markets are not dominated by any single arms 
producer, states witnout global geo-strategic or economic interests can carve 
out their slices from the many pies In addition, the classic
politico-strategic leverage that is associated with absolute supplier dependence 
is not necessarily desirable for non-superpowers because it carries obligations 
that can become burdensome (Algeria) and embarrassing ^Indochina) Thus, middle 
range powers like France benefit from LDC efforts to diversify their arms 
suppliers
To explain the arms and technology transfers for such states, and 
especially France, economic determinants are more appropriate than 
politico-strategic rationales The twofold distinction employed by the 
Stocknolra International Peace Research Institute ^biPRI) captures this point  ^
SIPRI distinguishes "global economic determinants' and "national economy 
determinants ' The former explains superpower transfers as being made on the 
basis of security objectives such as guaranteeing internal stability m  client 
states, insuring the flow of raw materials, and maintaining marxets for
5manufactured goods or access to cheap labor
While the market and cheap labor access criteria characterize the United 
bLates more than the UbbR, the emphasis on global determinants in both 
superpowers directs attention to the outward extension of security objectives as 
opposed to the inward focus of the national economy determinants of middle range 
powers ihese states are s nu uo export irms and technology primarily to 
improve their balance of payments, as a means to spread R&O costs, for economies 
of scale, and to ensure employment in military and Lelated industries Access 
to markets and raw materials are desirable side effects These "national 
economy determinants" characterize the French arms and arms technology exports 
system quite well The rollowing section will outline the evolution of this 
system, witn an emphasis on internal factors
ÍHE EVULUIiUN Ut THE frRENCH ARMb AND ARMb TECHNOLOGY EXPORT bYbTEM.
The development of the French armaments production system can be separated 
into two somewhat distinct evolutionary periods that are tied to a set of 
cumulatively overlapping security and economic determinants The first 
evolutonary period, beginning under the Fourth Republic and lasting into the 
late 1960s, was concerned with the reconstruction of an autonomous defense 
establishment to lessen import dependence and to increase long term political 
independence This was the cornerstone of the Gaullist policy to reestablish 
France as a viable European power in the postwar European security system, and 
it found its expression in the ongoing Eurocentric vs Atlanticist debate within 
NATO De Gaulle always tavored a greater Western European role m  the defense
óof the continent (at the expense of U S influence), and France was to be the 
leading power
As early as 1947 a five-year plan for the development of an arms industry 
was established 5 an(j in 1960  ^ five-year defense planning and budget cycles were 
introduced to further solidity the long term commitment to a broadly based arms 
production capability But these cycles were also designed to rationalize 
defense spending in the context of broader economic restraints The most 
general of these restraints was the relatively small demand of the French forces 
themselves To achieve economies of scale, 1 e greater production runs than 
could be domestically absorbed, the country nad to export part of its arms 
output The need to export was then exacerbated when conventional force 
procurement had to be reduced because of requirements of the new nuclear program 
which was being built up in the early 19b0s
in 1963 the percentage of procurement spent on strategic and tactical 
nuclear forces increased rapidly Between 1963 and 1968 approximately 5U 
percent of the military budget went to these forces Its share then decreased 
gradually, before it leveled off to around one third m  the early 1970s 6 
Domestic upheavals during the middle and late 1960s forced the French government
to further review its overall commitment to defense spending After 1968 the
percentage of the total budget allocated to defense dropped from above 20
percent to below 18 percent Since 1969 it has not exceeded 18 percent again ^
The combination of these two factors— increases in spending on nuclear 
forces and increased pressure to reduce defense related expenditures (and 
domestic arms sales) in favor of civilian programs— further stimulated the 
export emphasis of the arms industry Within the government bureaucracy the 
Delegation Generale pour L'Armement and its Direction Internationale, as well as
7diplomatic missions abroad, were enlisted in the sale of French armaments by 
the late 1960s France had become the third largest arras exporting country 
The second period began in the early 1970s, when arms exports had 
increasingly taxen on a momentum of their own fhe emphasis had shifted from 
the creation of an industry primarily tor domestic needs (which was to be 
sustained by exports only secondarily) to one that had become heavily export 
dependent Tne old argument of butter vs guns had thus been turned on its 
nead it became butter through the sale ot guns Arms exports are now credited 
with the creation of new employment in France They are expected to contribute 
to improving the balance of payments and are used to secure oil through barter 
arrangements 8
mere also has been little internal dissention on arms export issues 
While in opposition the Socialist Party had been critic »1 of such exports on 
ideological grounds, but once m  power, these reservations have subsided The 
Mitterand government on the whole has continued the liberal policies ot the 
preceding regimes and has been helped in overcoming possible scruples by the 
continued slump that has plagued the French economy in the 1900s This point 
was meule by former Defense Minister Charles Hernu in a 1982 interview with Le 
Figaro
Charles Hernu I am always surprised when people talk 
about arms sales m  that reproachful tone People 
forget that the Defense Minister is not only responsible 
for military personnel Out of 720,000 people who work 
for the Defense Ministry, there are 14J,000 civilians 
and 90,000 arsenal workers In addition, there are the
8armaments enterprises— the National Aerospace Industry 
Company, Thomson-CSF, Dassault, Renault Industrial 
Vehicles, Panhard and the Samt-htienne Arms Company 
employ J00,UUU workers and engineers As tor 
subcontracting, do you know how many it employs' One 
million*
Christine Olere Those figures are ail very convincing 
but why were they ignored for so long7 In opposition, 
Pierre Mauroy expressed indignation that France had 
become the third biggest arms exporter in the world 
And yet we have advanced
Charles Hernu I would like to remind you of the arras 
industries' contribution to research Do you know that 
we are the envy of the Americans in the sphere of 
lasers, carbon fibers, and the detection of submarines 
and nuclear weapons7 Do you know that Thomson-CSF is 
one of the world's leading exporters of advanced 
military technology7 Do you know that we are making 
great strides in research on infra-red night sights7 
At the 14 July parade nabody noticed that the helicopters 
were flying at night However that is a considerable 
advance ^
Not only is the trench arms industry today increasingly export dependent
9bat this very dependence has also been accompanied by international 
co-development ventures, co—production agreements and sales of licenses to both 
developed and developing countries Licensing agreements typically involve 
technology that has pasedt the development stage, while co-production is usually 
a consequence of joint development efforts borne recent licenses, however, have 
entailed retransfers of parts to France, and even joint stock companies tor the 
production of entire systems buch agreements have been concluded with both 
developed and developing countries 10 Co-developments, on the other hand, are 
generally limited to undertakings with developed countries because they tend to 
be in the forefront of new technology where LDCs can rarely contribute the 
know-how and financial commitments Consequently, trance has pursued most of 
these undertakings witn Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany H
Another indication of the export emphasis of the French arms industry can 
be found m  the fact that today some designs are exported before they enter the 
French services, or while they are still being evaluated The Crotale 
surface-to-air missile armored air defense system, developed m  collaboration 
with bouth Africa by Thomson-Cbf, went to bouth Africa before the trench Air 
Force received it ^  Other systems are developed for export only, or with a 
special emphasis on export ^
France sells its armaments not only on their respective merits and for 
economic benefits, but also because of clearly expressed political 
considerations The nation sees itself as an alternative supplier to the 
superpowers, and this political factor is identified in the only white paper on 
defense as a critical determinant of trench sales to developing states in
the former Defense Minister Charles Hernu reiterated this point
iU
Ought we to leave friendly nations alone in face of the 
two superpowers7 At present, wnen a country is armed by 
one of those two superpowers, the neighboring country, if 
it feels tnreatened, immediately asks for arms from the 
other That opposition between tne two blocs presents 
the most serious threat to world conflict So, yes I 
have a clear conscience when I sell arms to a country, 
if that prevents it from buying from one of the two 
superpowers ^
This seif ascribed role of France as an alternative supplier of arms and 
technology is coupled with an emphasis on reliability as a suppl.er Foreign 
policy and strategic objectives today are often second to economic or 
supplier-reliability criteria, and Mr Hernu's reference to 'friendly nations' 
could perhaps be interpreted as referring to presently not hostile nations" 
France officially abides by the United Nations arms embargo on South 
Africa, but licenses granted before the embargo are still upheld i e the 
Cactus/Crotale missile license has not been cancelled Similarly, when Libya 
transferred Mirage aircraft to Egypt during the 1971 October war, the Frenen 
government took no penalizing actions , despite the fact that the original sale 
to Libya placed restrictions on third country transfers
The trench case may thus be seen as an example of an arms producing country 
that initially exported to develop its domestic industry, but now finds that it 
must export to maintain it The emphasis on direct arms sales is clearly 
supported by tne variety of special exports that are offered, but tne dependence
\
li
on arms sales is also accompanied by a willingness to permit technology and 
component transters to developing countries either as inducements to further 
direct sales, or as additional sources of revenue
A Riló ihCtiNuLOGY TRANSFERS *RMS SALES BY ANY OTHER NAilh
It is impossible to define French arras ana arms technology export policy in 
anything resembling concrete guidelines Specific export criteria have not been 
published by the government for either, and, judging by the available data, 
exports have increasingly been determined more by economic opportunities than by 
strategic restraints On the occasions when embargoes or restrictions were 
placed, they were directed at specific countries and once at 'countries on the 
field of battle", i e from 1967 to early 1974 in the Middle East But this 
regional embargo was ineffective, and even tlie Mitterand governments 
restrictions on sales to 'fascist and racist ' regimes is by no means complete
The evidence that has emerged indicates chat enere is little difference m  
policy between sales of nardware and technology Ihe differences that do exist 
seem to be rooted more in the limited technical and financial absorption 
capabilities of many LDCs and in obvious short term economic advantages of 
direct sales over licenses and assembly agreements
Aa noted above, the most enduring motive tor French exports of military 
goods —  arms and technology —  has been economic, i e to achieve economies of 
scale which then would help sustain large national defense production 
capabilities Ihe need for such capabilities is couched m  strategic 
objectives such as improved national security, increased independence, an escape 
from superpower dependence and the ability to provide third states with an
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alternative from superpower arras dependence In ali these objectives, France 
has been somewhat successful beyond these strategic motives, arms technology 
export trends can be grouped as falling into three successive periods The 
first of these coincided with the attempted resurrection/maintenance of the 
empire etter WW li and it ended with its dissolution m  1962 The second 
period was characterized by a gradual shift toward economic transfer 
determinants, coupled with some restraints, and the third, beginning in the 
middle 1970s, witnessed the creation of joint French-LDC companies and was also 
characterized by continued economic determinants
The reconstruction and empire resurrection period is perhaps the only one 
in which France allowed concrete power politics to influence its arms and 
technology transfers But it was hardly a global projection, nor was tne 
country a major player or capable ol being one As TABLE II indicates, arms 
exports never exceeded one billion (current) francs before 1963, and the trench 
industry was concerned with the rebuilding of its production capabilities Ihis 
effort, coupled with the requirements of the armed forces, absorbed most of the 
output Furthermore, the empire rebuilding efforts involved tne Fourth Republic 
m  three wars (Indochina, buez, and Algeria) Other factors which certainly 
impeded technology transfers were the flooding of the market by the United 
States and Britain with surplus equipment, and the inability of most developing 
nations to initiate domestic production of war materials
France's major arms client in this early period was Israel,^  and it was a 
supplier-client relationship that was based on mutual strategic interests Both 
states faced a shared threat —  Israel from the newly independent Arabic states 
trance from these same states and the rising tide of nationalism that undermined 
its hold on Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia It is no accident that a large
13
component of the Israeli ground and air forces were equipped first with allied 
arms retransferred Irom France, and then increasingly with trench-made 
equipment The Mirage III, for example, went into squadron service virtually 
simultaneously in noth states,^ and the quantity of equipment transfereu in 
1953 and 1956 indicates a close cooperation prior to the 1936 Suez war 10
It is not surprising, then, that the first French license tor a major 
system ever granted to a non European or NATO country went to Israel (see TABLE 
111) In 1^5/ an agreement tor 100 touga M lister trainers was signed ana m  
19oU tne first Israeli aircraft, assembled trom French components, went otf the 
line ^
The second major license ot tnis period, also concluded in 1957, went to 
Argentina Unlike the Israeli transfer, however, tne Argentine agreement was 
accompanied by a direct sale of 54 MS /bO Pans communications/trainer aircraft 
and an assembly contract for a further 48 This was a commercial sale, and it 
should be seen as an early eftort to break into the domain ot the United States 
by sweetening a sale with tne transfer ot some technology The point that 
needs to be made, however, is that arms technology transfers had already been an 
integral part ot French arms sales
Tnis early period came to an end with the Algerian war in I9b2 The empire 
was gone, and with it the demands of the French forces which had been tueled by 
the wars The focus now could and had to be on exports a focus that was also 
sharpened, as pointed out above, by the shite ot available procurement resources 
to tne new nuclear force Now arms and arms technology were increasingly 
exported by criteria designed to support the indigenous security needs 
(military, raw material as well as social, i e butter through arms) rather 
than, as nad been the case with Israel, as a means of power projection In this
14
second period French arms and related technology export policy with regard to 
LDCs was characterized by efforts to overcome the stigma of the former imperial 
policies The result was a period of relatively ambivalent export restrictions 
and a pusn to develop LDC arms markets
The region which again was at the forefront of tnese policy changes was the 
Middle hast France's commonality of interests with Israel had disappeared with 
the Algerian posessions, and the formerly close ties began to turn into 
liabilities Now France's major objective was to secure oil, and oil was 
controlled by the Arab states Thus, after the 1967 war Israel was placed under 
an embargo on offensive weapons This was extended to a full embargo by 1969, 
and conjoined to a regional embargo on 'states on the field of battle" that 
officially lasted to 1974
These were, however, export restrictions that were incomplete, as arms and 
technology continued to enter the region An arms-for-oil agreement was 
concluded with Libya in 19/0 when that country purchased 110 Mirage III 21 
Israel also continued to receive some arms alter 1967, such as buper Frelon 
helicopters, ex-German Fouga Magisters (refurbished in France) and Saar Class 
gunboats, the last of which were obtained with falsified transfer papers from 
Cherbourg harbor after the 1969 embargo One of the more controversial sales 
was that of two Dassault MD 660 tactical missiles with a range of about 45u km 
These missiles were developed on an Israeli order, and are capable of carrying 
nuclear weapons 22 The last arms technology transfer was concluded in 1969 
before the embargo, for helicopter and louga Magister engines Other licenses 
were granted for spare parts production for Mirage ills and for a JO nun aircraft 
cannon (see TAiJLL III) On the whole , however, the volatile Middle Last would 
not receive great quantities of arms from irance until the early to raid 1970s,
15
and the influx of arms technology, this time to Arab states, did not begin again 
until the late 1970s
Arras technology exports elsewhere in the developing world, on the other 
hand, were a microcosm of the expanding trench arms export efforts In the 
196ÜS and early 1970s licenses for major systems were granted to Argentina, 
brazil, Pakistan, Lndia and South Ainca (see TAbLE ill) 21
Argentina had been one of the first countries to receive a trench assembly 
agreement in 1957, and the country had been an occasional customer for aircraft 
missiles and armor since 1956 24 Details of this second agreement are 
uncertain, but Argentina built or assembled at least 10 —  and up to 100 —  
AMX-ll light tanks from 1969 on 25
brazil, like Argentina, had previously purchased French arms and also like 
Argentina, was developing its own arms industry while at the same time 
diversitying its suppliers Ihe 1972 assembly agreement for h rench-Gerraan 
Roland I sAMs was one such effort It was to lead to greater cooperation, 
including a joint stock company
Pakistan tirst received trench equipment in I960 the same year the license 
for ten Ale lette III helicopters was signed 2b This has been the only French 
license for a major system to Pakistan, which has focused more on maintenance 
facilities for its imported weapons than on production capabilities 27
More interesting cases are India and South Africa both have developed 
substantial indigenous production capabilities, and with the transter of French 
technology helping to establish the helicopter industry in India, and the 
armored car production in South Africa India is the older importer of French 
arms, having received Ouragon aircraft as early as 1951, while the first French 
arms sold to South Africa (Alouette II helicopters) arrived nine years later, in
16
1962
In 1962 the first license for SA 31b Alouette 111 helicopters was granted 
to India Production began in 1965 and by 1982, 221 Alouettes had been built, 
some for export ^  Other licenses foiloweu, tor the Lama helicopter ana SS 11 
surface to surface missile in 1970, for the Harpon anti-tank missile (a version 
of the SS li) in 1971, for Aviso frigates in 1974, for R 550 nr-to-air missiles 
in 1977 and finally, a contract to build three explosives manufacturing 
plants 3U ihe first major lice ise granted to South Africa was for some lOUU AML 
60/90 armored cars m  1965 followed by a license for the Mirage III and FI m  
the early 1970s,31 for Puma helicopters m  197J, Crotale/Cactus SAMs in 1974, 
and for some six frigates in 1975
The pattern that emerges from these transfers again indicates the close 
relationship between arms and arms technology exports As one might expect, 
license sales have in all cases been preceded by, and tend to run parallel to 
continued sales Today recipients also have built up a substantial indigenous 
production capability 32 suggesting an indirect willingness on behalf ot Irenen 
policymakers to foster such efforts, or at least a deliberate lack of restraint 
This argument follows from Charles Hernu's reference to the superpower 
domination of the arms market and is supported by hdward Kolodziej's research 
efforts on the French arms production and transfer system He maintains that a 
major objective (and justification) of French arms transfers was to contribute 
to the raultipolanzation of the international system by diversifying supplier 
options for recipient countries 33 lhus an indirect willingness to help LDCs 
obtain a greater security independence can be seen here as another contribution 
to increased raultipolanzation
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buch a strategy would not necessarily be inconsistent with efforts to 
increase arms exports As noted above, France has lost ground m  recipient 
countries where it was the sole or principal supplier, but gained in states that 
rely on multiple suppliers While it may be economically disadvantageous to 
help strongly dependent paying arms clients develop an indigenous capability, 
this is not necessarily the case for countries with multiple suppliers In a 
competitive arms market, technology transfers create and help maintain technical 
ties and general contacts furthermore, no developing country is, or is likely 
to be self sufficient soon They will continue to have to import much of their 
military equipment directly 3d Thus, arms technology transfers are an integral 
component of arms transfers
This pattern has continued to be apparent in France's third export period 
beginning in the early to mid 1970s Again the Middle hast plays a central 
role With the rise in oil prices after 197j , France actively pursued the Arab 
arms market In August 1974 the embargo against states "on the field of battle 
was lifted But by April 197a trance had already received orders totalling one 
billion dollars from Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and baudi Arabia 34 trench 
arms technology exports were somewhat slower to reach these states, and compared 
to direct arras sales they are minuscule 35 This is not surprising since hgypt 
is the only country with some production capabilities36 and Saudi Arabia is just 
beginning to develop its own
One of tne first French technology ventures in the region was with the Arab 
Organization for Industrialization (A01), when the Arab-trench Aircraft Company 
was established 1975 A licensing agreement to produce Alpha Jets followed m  
1978, and in that same year the Arab Electronics Company (in which the French 
electronics firm ihomson is a JU percent partner) and tne Arab-French Engine
ld
Company (in which the French aircraft engine manufacturer SNECMA is a JO percent 
partner), were created J7 The status of the original AUI is today somewhat 
uncertain The organization was founded in 1975 by baudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar 
and the United Arab emirates, but the 1979 Camp David Accords prompted the 
Saudis Qatar and the UAE to withdraw from it -*** Egypt, however, is pursuing 
tne Alpha Jet project and has been discussing a joint military-industrial 
cooperation with Turkey that may lead to a license production of the Mirage 
2ÜUU, and possibly a tank. *39
France has signed no major license with Saudi Arabia yet, but it did enter 
into a contract m  1975 to modify the Crotale SAM to Saudi specifications,^ and 
in 1984 concluded a $4 billion to develop a complete air defense system tor 
Saudi Arabia The interesting twist in this "technology transfer" is tnat Saudi 
leaders have asserted that the large sums spent to develop the system give them 
a eto power over its use, either by France or any third state French sources 
have not denied ihis assertion
Again France helped to create a joint company for the production of 
licensed equipment LDC, this time in brazil m  1977 Here Aerospatiale, the 
state government of Minas Gerais, and a private Brazilian manufacturer 
established Helibras m  a joint ownership of 41 percent, 51 percent and 1 
percent respectively, to produce Lama and Ecureuil helicopters ^2 The licenses 
for both helicopters were signed m  1978 brazil also obtained a license tor 
the Daupnm (1979) and Puma (1980) helicopters Thus, as was the case in India 
France was again instrumental in creating an entire arms industry in a
developing country
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Other licenses granted during this third period went to Indonesia, Chile 
and the People's Republic of China Indonesia has been assembling Puma and 
Super Puma helicopters 43 Chile has completed three Batral Type landing ships 
from a 1979 license which does not seem to have been affected by the 1981 
Mitterand government embargo on arms deliveries to 'fascist and racist" 
countries, although this embargo cut off arms deliveries Finally, the People's 
Republic of China plans to assemble SO Dauphin helicopters
The two major purchasers of trench arms technology in the late 1960s and 
early 19/0s were no longer major recipients in the late 19/Os South Africa was 
subjected to a UN embargo and, after some pressure from its former black African 
colonies, France has complied with this No new licenses have been granted 
since 1979, although existing ones have remained in force
The Indian case is more complex Local input on the Lama and Alouette 
helicopters is almost complete,i and India is now developing an indigenously 
designed Advanced Light Helicopter The only major license under serious 
discussion since 1977 has been j:or the Mirage 2000, and it was not for lack ot 
etlort on the French part that no agreement was reached
The leverage that can be exerted by LDCs with potentially large markets was 
made especially clear here Both Britain and France vied for this sale, Britain 
with the Jaguar (coproduced with France) and France with the Mirage 2000 Both
France's Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation 
continued to pursue the sale even after India announced that the Soviets their 
most modern fighters,the MiG 291, and after tne licensing option had formally 
lapsed 44
Most generally, then, the bommercial preponderance in technology sales has 
continued in this third period But unlike the previous period, there now
suppliers offered licenses, and
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appears to be a shift toward industrial cooperation m  the transfer of 
technology The direct involvement m  the A01 industries ,and in brazil, will 
guarantee French interests a continued presence in these strategic countries, 
and should make it easier to enter the substantial emerging subcomponent market 
for indigenous" LDC designs ^
The other, tnough less clear, trend observed in this third period was the 
granting or helicopter assembly agreements to Indonesia and the People's 
Republic of China Neither had previously been a major arms purchaser, but it 
is apparent that, at least in the Chinese case, France had high expectations for 
the opening ot another market, fostered by the numerous Chinese shopping 
missions m  the early 1900s m  Lurope and the United States
Conclusion
This paper has argued that French arms technology sales are motivated by 
tne same objectives that drive direct arms sales Direct transfers were pursued 
initially to help create the greatest possible range of domestically produced 
systems via economies of scale This export emphasis has created a 
preponderance ot economic export determinants that are couched m  some very 
broad strategic objectives
trance's role as a middle range power makes possible tms torm of detached 
involvement m  the international security system of arms supplier-recipient 
relationships The country has few direct overseas security commitments,^0 and 
its typical role as one of several arms suppliers to specific recipients nas not 
led to direct trench military involvement since the dissolution of the
empire 4/
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lhe liberal arms export policy then nas brougnt lew disadvantages to tne 
country Weapons are supplied to paying LDC customers, regardless of the type 
of regime, as long as they do not threaten direct French interests Since there 
are lew direct interests, and since this policy is designed to contribute to the 
multilateralization of security commitments of LDCs there are few obvious 
restraints The self-oriented role as an alternative to superpower dependence 
and as a champion of LDC independence rounds out the picture
The threats posed to the country by weapons exports to LDCs also seems 
remote Only the erratic policies of Libya are occasionally mentioned with 
respect to the Mediterranean Elsewhere the security threats have been 
economic, primarily related to oil supplies tor these cases France was quick 
to disassociate itself from Israel and South Africa (due to Nigerian Pressure) 
and, in the case of the Arab states retained not only its oil supplies but 
gained major shares in the arms market
Arms technology transfers neatly fit into the same mold Licenses clearly 
are a way to sell trench equipment, as they have tended to go to states that 
were and continue to be, purchasers of other trench arras In this sense they 
may again be seen as a means to help relax the superpower grip on the arms 
market and to maintain supplier ties
lue loosening of the superpower hold on the international arms transfer 
system can only benefit middle range powers lixe trance, as the trend towards 
supplier diversification opens more markets in addition, technology sales 
although they generate fewer short term economic rewards, nevertheless help 
maintain the French industry through royalties and component transfers 
Furthermore, they help open long term inroads into the emerging LDC production 
centers The creation of joint French-LDC stock companies is indicative of the
interest in this market
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Notes
1 My major sources are the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRi) Arms Trade Registers (Massachusetts The MIT Press, 1975; and Edward 
Kolodziej, French Arms Transfer Data Rase, the Program m  Arms Control, 
Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois 
Components of this data base will be published in a book by Edward Kolodziej 
entitled Making and Marketing Arms Ihe French Experiment and its Implications 
for tne international System
1 thank Dr Kolodziej for the invaluable use of his research data and the 
use of the book manuscript
2 The single erratic increase in the 1953-57 period is due to increased 
supplies to Israel for the Suez War
3 Kolodziej latcing and Marketing Arms xbid ine following data are drawn 
rrom Table 6 1 Supplier relations are defined as follows
Sole Supplier One state supplies 96/ or more of the value of military imports 
of a given recipient state
Principal Supplier One state supplies 5b to 95/
Multiple suppliers No one state supplies more tnan 552
4 òlPRI Yearbook, 198i, p 119
5 Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms, Chapter 1
24
6 Edward tColodziej, "Economic Determinants ot the Transfer of Arms and 
Military Technology under the French Fifth Republic", Figure 2, (Program in Arms 
Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois, 1982) 
This article was also published in the 1983 SiPRi Yearbook, pp 371-390 Page 
references given here refer to the ACDIS printing of the paper
7 Ibid , Table 3 This drop is also partly explained by the cessation ot the 
Algerian and Indochina conflicts by 1962
8 The limes ot April 14, 1981, for example, reported that 80/ of French arms 
exports in 1980-1981 went to the Middle East, some of these arras were bartered 
for oil Similarly, Jane's Defence Weekly of October 20, 1984 reported that Abu 
Dhabi may order 18 more Mirage 2000 m  a barter arrangement based on oil
9 United states Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), September 14 
1982, p R-l
10 Current licensing agreements with developed countries are in force with 
Italy for the Milan (ATM; and Roland II (SAM), with Romania for tne SA-316B 
Alouette III and SA-330 Puma helicopters, with Spain for Agosta Class 
submarines with Britain for the Milan (ATM), witn the United States for the 
Roland II (SAM) and with Yugoslavia for the SA-342 Gazelle helicopter See 
Jane s Defence Weekly, Special Edition on the French defense industry, March 
23, 1985 tor licenses with LDCs see TABLE III
11 Major co-development programs witn Britain include the Jaguar aircraft, the
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Puma, Gazelle and Lynx helicopters as well as the Martel air to surface anti 
radar missile Ihose with Germany include the Transall aircraft, the Alpha Jet 
trainer, the Milan and Hot anti tank missiles, tne Roland 1 and II surface to 
air missiles, as well as the Ratac radar controlled artillery system A 
collaborative project for a next generation MUT is presently being pursuit
There arc only two major co-development programs with developing countries 
The first is an armored version of the Crotale bAM, developed in conjunction 
witn South Africa, and the second m  the development of an air defense system 
for Saudi Arabia fo*- which the Saudis do, however, only contribute the 
financial backing Both cases will be discussed below bee, also, note i2 for 
the Crotale
12 Development of tms system was begun in 19b4, and production started in 
1971 The first battery went to South Africa, while the second was ordered for 
the French Air Force in 1972 Tne missile also entered service one year later 
in Libya bouree F M von benger und htterlin Tanks of the World, 198J (The 
Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, Annapolis, Maryland, 19b3) 
p io9
1J The AMX-JU MBT was introduced as an export version in 1973 and the 1979 
AMX-J2 MBT prototype was introduced as a modernized and upgraded AMX-3Ü tor 
export only The AMX-1JB with a 11)5 mm gun is tor export only —  the French 
forces' AMX-13S only had 90 mm guns The Mirage V and 50 were designed with an 
emphasis on export A variety of APCs are also build tor export only, or as 
modified versions tor export The VBC-90 and the t.RC-90 are strictly export 
items The AML lU VIT, the VCR (versions A,B,C,D,E) and the VLRA/ALM are ail
26
export versions based on the AML series bources see footnote 1J for armor, 
and Janets All the World's Aircraft, 198J-1984 tor aircraft (New York Jane's 
Publishing Inc , 1984) p 61
14 France, Ministère de Defense, Livre blanc sur la defense nationale (Pans, 
1972), I, p 54
15 FbIS, September 14, 1982, p K.-J
16 This discussion deliberately excludes the newly independent but generally 
rather poor French colonies which were often supplied with grant aid Nor is it 
argued that Israel was the only recipient of French arms
17 For a more detailed account of this relationship see Robert Harkavy and 
Stephanie Neuman's discussion ot the Israeli defense industry in James Ratz 
editor Arms Production m  Developing Countries, Chapter 1U, ’Israel' 
(Massachusetts Lexington books, 1984>, and Kolodziej, lakmg and Marketing 
Arras, ibid , Chapter 7 lor a more general discussion of French exports to the 
region see also Roger Pajak's "French and UntistTArms Sales m  the Middle East 
A Policy Perspective", Middle Last Review, Spring 1978
18 lor a listing of these transfers see the SiPRi Arms Trade Registers op 
cit , pp 52-55
19 The lull extent of the components tor this aircraft built under the license 
is uncertain The first aircraft to be produced in Israel were assembled from
11
foreign components See also note 5 in TAiJLfc, III
20 This was not the first such sale in the 19o0s the fouga Magister also nad 
been sold tor license production and directly to the fRG and tinland The 
German sale had been made after the aircraft had been selected as a NATO trainer 
(62 direct sales and 10Ö for license production) while Finland Purchased 20 
outright, and built 62 under license bouree Jane s All the World's Aircraft 
1969-70, (London Jane's Publishing Company, 1970)
21 borne ot these aircraft were retransfered to Lgypt in 197J, despite 
contractual prohibitions
22 blPRl Arms trade Registers, op cit , pp 52-55 for arms transfers, and p 144 
for a description of the MD-6b0 missile
2J for a discussion of the respective arms production capabilities in these 
countries see also James Katz, ibid , chapters four (Argentina), five (brazil) 
fourteen (Pakistan), nine (India) and seventeen vbouth Africa)
24 blPRl Arms Trade Registers, lbia , pp 1ÜJ-106
25 See note 14 m  TAbLb H i
2b Although the blPRl Arms Trade Registers cite this as a license, the small 
production run of ten makes it more likely that these helicopters were
assembled
¿8
I I  Although self sufficient in small arms, Pakistan still focuses on 
returbisning facilities tor its Chinese F-b and French Mirage tighters and a 
tank rebuilding factory for Chinese T-59 tanks In the long run Pakistan 
intends to expand these facilities to indigenous production Source 
Hasan-Askan Rizvi, 'PaRistan', in Katz, ibid , pp 273-76
28 SiPRi Yearboox, 1982, p 346 Stephanie Neuman also points out that India 
exports some licensed produced components to trance (Neuman, 1 Ihird World Arms 
Production and the Global Arms Transfer System in Katz, op cit p 26)
Jane s Detence Weekly of September 29, 1984 (p 267) also cites eight Alouette
III deliveries to the USSR, with more ordered
29 The Lntac anti-tank missile was, accordi lg to Le Monde, also built under 
license, but such an agreement could not be confirmed elsewhere This missile 
is a version ot the SS iU, wmch predates the SS 11 and is similar in 
appearence See also note 20 in TABLh III
30 South, December 1973,p 86 No date for this contract, awarded to SNPh is 
given
Ji lhe degree of South African production input on these aircratt is not 
certain See notes one and two of 1ABLL III
32 Pakistan is an exception here, but as Rizvi (ibid , see note 27) points 
out, tne country is actively pursuing the development of its capabilities
JJ Koiodziej, Making and Marketing Arms, ibid , chapter 2 The author based 
these conclusions on extensive interviews with both government and industry 
otticiais it is beyond the scope ot this paper to discuss long run strategies 
in great detail h<_re, but Lne French sell portrayal as a superpower alternative 
certainly has been visible in the Eurocentric vs Atlanticist debate within NATO 
and in the French balancing act between the superpowers m  Europe as well as 
elsewhere
J4 Koiodziej, Making and Marketing Arms, ibid , chapter 7 Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq were to become the largest recipients, and the arms-oil connection becomes 
even clearer when one reviews the French oil imports from these states In 197J 
Saudi Arabia supplied 22 52 and Iraq U  6/ of all crude oil imports tty 1979 
the respective shares were JJ I and 19 b, i e over half of all oil supplies 
came trom these states source United Nations, World Trade Annual Vol 11,
(New York. Walker and Company, 197J and 1979)
J5 tty 19Ò1 7b/ of all weapons sold abroad went to the Middle hast Source
South, December 19bJ, p bb
J6 tor a discussion of bgyptian-produced equipment see Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, 
Lgypt in Katz, ibid , p 145
J7 ibid, p 144 and see TABLE III The Arab-Bntsh Helicopters Company also 
plans to produce the British-French co-developed Lynx helicopter, but French 
firms are not a partner m  the licensing agreement
30
38 Ibid , p 146
39 Janets Defence Weekly, August 25 1964, p 26U
4U Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1983-84, p 5o5,(New York Jane's Publishing 
Company, 1984)
41 tColodziej , Maxing and Marketing Arms, op cit , chapter 7
42 Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1983-84, op cit , p 18 Jane's does not 
elaborate who owns the remaining three percent See also note 10, TABLE III
43 S1PRI Yearbooks only list the two SA 330 Puma licenses cited in TAtíLL 111, 
but the 1983-84 Jane's All the World's Aircraft (op cit , p 47) also mentions 
tue assembly of the AS 332 Super Puma and lists 69 Indonesian orders from the 
Air Force, Navy Forestry Service and and a civilian airline The first Super 
Puma is said to have been assembled in 1983 No date for the license is given
44 ihe Indian option to license build the Mirage lapsed on June 30 19b4 When
the MiG 29 sale was announced in August, a Dassault official in Delhi let it be
known that the "option could be extended" Forty Mirage 2000 were sold as 
were 43 Jaguars Thus India will have the most modern Western and Lastern
fighter aircraft in its inventory when the MiG 29s arrive Source Jane s
Defence Weetcly August 18, 1984, p 224 See also, same source, "French Defence
Special Edition from Pans", March 23, 1985, p 508
31
43 All major systems designed in LDCs contain substantial foreign technology 
imports, typically engines, drive trains, electronics and guns bee Stephanie 
Neuman, "international Stratification and ihird World Military Industries", op 
cit p 176
4b Frenen troops and advisors outside of hurope are stationed m  the central 
African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Saudi Arabia and Senegal
47 The temporary role in Lebanon and the ongoing involvement in Chad are 
clearly not a consequence of arms supply commitments, but must be seen as a 
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Aras Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports 1956-1980 
(in current francs, billions)
Arms Exports as
Year Total Exports Arms Exports / of Total
1956 16 24 29 1 79
1957 18 89 46 2 43
1958 21 53 53 2 46
1959 27 75 78 2 81
1960 33 90 53 1 56
1961 35 67 87 2 44
1962 36 59 98 2 68
1963 40 50 1 32 3 26
1964 44 96 1 80 4 00
1965 50 24 1 99 3 96
1966 54 22 1 86 3 43
1967 57 01 2 03 3 56
1968 63 70 2 11 3 31
1969 78 81 1 99 2 52
1970 100 52 2 48 2 47
1971 115 25 2 79 2 42
1972 113 39 3 67 3 24
1973 162 46 5 07 3 12
1974 222 07 6 68 3 01
1975 227 20 8 29 3 65
1976 273 24 11 64 4 26
1977 319 22 14 71 4 61
1978 357 60 17 24 4 82
1979 427 95 20 45 4 78
1980 490 55 24 45 4 98
Source Edward Kolodziej, French Arms Export Data Base, op cited These are 
figures drawn from French parliamentary sources which are no longer 
published since the election of the Socialist government
TABLE lil
Licensing Agreements Wich Developing Countries
I AIRCRAFT - HIGH PERFORMANCE
Weapon Licensor Licensee
rlirage 111 France South Africa
Mirage FI F rance South Africa
Alpha Jec France (.FRG)* Egypt







— — Jb 1
1971 1979 100 1
19/Ö 0 — 160
1979 4 _ _
* co-producer ot weapon system, not included m  formal licensing agreement











France Israel 1957 i960 10U D
Mb 7o0 A 
Fans
t ranee Argentin i 195/ C 19t>0 )** 4ö6
** estimates
L U  HhLÍCUPTERS
Weapon Licensor Licensee
bA 3lb b r ance India
Alouette ill France Paxistan




bA 330 France bouth Africa
Puma b ranee Indonesia
France Indonesia
France Brazil
Lynx UK (brance)* Egypt
bA 365 France People's







Year of Year Production Total
License btarted Plan
I9b2 7 19bD 219
I9bó 19/2 10 »
1970 9 19/2 y 140
1978 1979 30




1980 — 34 H




*Lo-producer oí weapon system, not included in formal licensing agreement
IV LNGINES
Weapon Licensor Licensee




















AML 60/yo France bouth Africa
Aí IX i J France Argentina












bb li trance india 1 9/0 19/1 ÍUUÜ+ 15
Harpon t rance India 1971 — —
Roland I t rance 
(1 RG)* 17
Brazil 1972 1977 80
Crotale 1 rance bouth Atnca 19/4 1978 __ 18
K d5u ilagic t rance India 1977 19 — —























bouree Koloaziej , Making and Mdrteeting Arms, op cit This daca was updated 
and revised where necessary, using Che same principal sources that were 
relied on in Kolodziej's French Arms Transfer Data Base, op cit
Other Principal bources
Brassey"s Infantry Weapons of the NATO Armies (London Brassey s Publisners 
Limited, 1979)
Jane"s All the World's Aircraft, and Jane's Fighting bhips, 19b0-1984 Yearbooks 
(London Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1984)
btocknolm International Peace Research Institute ^blPRi), Arms Trade Registers 
The Arms Trade with the Tmrd World, (Cambridge The Mil Press 19/5)
S1PR1, World Armaments ind Disarmament, bIPRI Yearbook 1968-1984, (Cambridge 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Ham, Inc 1984) Publishers vary over this
period
Le Monde, 1960-1983
The primary sources for this data were the SIPRI Yearbooks Confirmation 
on SIPRI data was sought from tne other sources where SIPRI data were ambiguous 
Greater reliance was placed on later sources tor corrections of previously 
published information Conflicts, lapses, and unclanties in the listings are 
footnoted
Notes Licensing Accords
1 The SIPRI Arms Trade Registers only mentions that 36 Mirage III were to 
be produced under license in South Africa No dates are available, but the 
license was probably granted in the early 1970s
2 The 1977 and I97d SIPRI Yearbook list 48 orders ot which lb were to be 
directly imported and 32 were to be assembled in South Africa SIPRI lists a 
total planned production of 1UU urcraft Later SIPRIs do not mention further 
details of the licensing agreements
j Ihe 19/9 SIPRI Yearbook cites 197a as the licensing year, the 19öU
edition estimates that the license was confirmed in 1979 No further details 
are available
4 The 1979, 1980 and 1981 SIPRI Yearbooks cite an agreement tor 15U 110
and 105 Jaguars respectively The 1982 Yearbook lists only 45 orders, stating 
that local assembly of components was taking place, and that the 'licensed
producrxon of another 60 would be unlikely due to a Mirage 2000 deal with 
France '
5 The 1969-1970 Jane's All the Wond's Aircraft cites 52 Fouga lagister 
orders or deliveries to Israel Of these, 56 were built in Israel The blPRl 
Arms Trade Registers list a total of 125 delivered Twenty five of these were 
former German stock, while another 100 were said to have been built under 
license between I960 and 1964 The 1964-65 Jane's All the World s Aireraft 
states that the first aircraft comming off the line in Israel were assembled 
from trench components
6 The 19t>0—61 Jane s All the World s Aircralt cites an order of 102 
aircraft, 48 of wmch were to be assembled in Argentina
7 The 1980 SiPRI Yearbook indicates that the 1962 license may have been 
renegotiated in 1979 The 1981 and 1982 edition no longer mention this
8 SiPRL Yearbooks indicate that manufacture ol the Alouette III would 
proceed in two stages, from assembly to an increasingly substantial portion of 
locally made parts No numbers are given The blPRl Arms Trade Registers cites 
four deliveries in 19oo and ten more licensed produced helicopters m  1972
9 Prior to the 1979 Yearbook blPRl lists 1970 as the licensing year and 
1972 as tne year production started In the 1979 through 1982 editions, 1971 is 
listed as the licensing year and 197J as the year production started
Hi The 1979 blPRI Yearbook lists 1977 as the year of the licensing 
agreement for the Ecureuil Thereafter the helicopter is listed as the Ab 35uM 
Esquilo, «lth a licensing agreement dated in 197« This neiicopter is to be
produced over a ten year period in a new company of which France owns 45/ Also 
LeMonde February 4, 1978
11 The 1982 SIPRI Yearbook estimates that 34 Pumas will be obtained '
12 Tne 19Ü0 SIPRI Yearbook only cites that a license production contact 
for 280 helicopters was signed in 1978 No other information is available
U  Le Monde. June 2, i97J
14 The 197J SIPRI Yearbook reports a 1968 license the 1979 edition 
reports 1969 as the licensing year No production figures are cited in the 19/j 
edition but tne 1979 Yearbook cites a current annual production of 12 tor 19/8 
rhe biPRi A m s  Trade Registers mention an assembly agreement for 30 AiMX 13 
between 19ö9 and 1971 only Le Monde 2d February 1968, notes a licensing 
accord with Argentina, and the 1979-80 Military Balance cites an inventory of 
120 AMX-13, (London International Institute for strategic Studies, 1979) p 7b
15 The SIPRI Arms Trade Registers report a licensing agreement for the 
bS 11 tor the period from 1971 to 1973 the i9/5 slPRI Yearbook then notes that 
in 1974 complete production rights are handed over to India, and the 1981 
Yearbook estimates that 8600 missiles had been produced by 1980
16 Le Monde, January 9, 1971 The Harpon is an anti-tank version of the
bb 11
17 In the 1977 and 1978 SIPRI Yearbooks both France and Germany are 
listed as licensors The 1980 edition lists only trance
18 fhe 1980-1982 SlPRi Yearbooks only cite an annual production ot 100 
missiles
19 Only the 1979 bIPRI Yearbook cites the 1977 agreement No further 
data was available in later SIPRI editions
20 Le Monde, November 8, 1971 The Entac is an anti-tank version of the
bS 10
21 Only the 1975 and 197b bIPRI Yearbooks list this agreement Later 
editions no longer mention it
22 The 1977 and 1978 bIPRI Yearbooks cite this agreement saying that 
construction was announced as indigenous, but that the frigates were "perhaps 
originally to have been built in Portugal "
2J The 1980 through 198J bIPRI Yearbooks cite a license for two batral
Type landing ships, but the 1983-84 Janets Fighting Ships cites three produced 
and commissioned in Argentina by 1984
»)

